Latvia and the Latvians Frederic T. Harned, Harvard University (part of a larger M.I.T. study), 1973

National Attitudes

I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

The Latvians are a small people, ethnically distinct from their neighbors except for the Lithuanians. For centuries they have maintained their distinctiveness in spite of assimilative efforts by their German and Russian overlords. The development of an intelligentsia in the latter half of the nineteenth century coincided with a period of rapid industrial development, resulting in the formation of both nationalist and socialist-internationalist trends. During the Russian Civil War the Latvians became even more divided amongst themselves--pro-Communists against anti-Communists--than were the Estonians or Lithuanians. The establishment of the independent Latvian republic isolated most pro-Bolshevik Latvians, however, and Stalin's purges decimated those Latvians who lived in the USSR. There were few native Communists with strong local ties left by the time Latvia became part of the Soviet Union. Oriented toward west-central Europe by their heritage of Germanic culture, religion, alphabet, and historic trade ties, the Baltic peoples are the most Westernized portion of the Soviet population and have served as a major channel for the introduction of Western ideas and fashions into the Soviet Union. [1] Their higher level of economic development and welfare, both at the time of incorporation into the Soviet Union and at present, combines with this background to produce an environment in which the Latvians may well feel themselves superior to the Russians and other Slavs. [2]

The incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union occurred within the lifetime of almost 60% of its present population. [3] Despite the fact that Soviet historiography has slowly eliminated references to the significant roles played by the "changed international circumstances" (a euphemism for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) and by the Red Army, the Sovietization of Latvia was neither free nor voluntary. In fact, it led to the deportation of most of its political leaders and a major portion of its mobilized and educated population, as well as to considerable emigration. This traumatic series of events left many Latvians with relatives in the West, a factor which has led the Soviet regime to make unceasing efforts to counter and discredit the information and political activities of the exiles. [4]

The Soviet period of Latvian history has seen a continued large immigration of Russians and other Slavs into the republic. This has significantly reduced the predominance of ethnic Balts in the population, especially in the cities. A great deal of this immigration was connected with the re-establishment of heavy industry in Latvia, and some natives have argued that a primary purpose of such industrialization was to provide for the importation of Russians. [5]

The small size and slow growth of the native contingent in the CPL have meant that political power in the republic was and continues to be exercised by Russians and by imports of Latvian origin who had long been resident in Russia and who speak Latvian imperfectly. This leadership has resisted the tendency to become "re-nationalized" and to act as a buffer between Moscow and national communists that seems to have prevailed in Estonia. [6] They remain close to the Moscow line, perhaps influenced by the rise of one of their number, Arvids Pelshe, to the Chairmanship of the CPSU Party Control Committee. The one attempt of native communists to gain influence and to speak out for republic and national interests was crushed in 1959. [7]

The attitudes of Latvians today toward the Soviet system in general and toward the future of their nation in particular are of course difficult to deter mine. Most information has to be gleaned from official publications, private communications, and the reports of visitors. Latvian participation in samizdat has been relatively small, especially in comparison to the activities of Estonians, Lithuanians, and the Jewish population of Riga. The latter group has played a conspicuous role in the current Jewish awakening in the Soviet Union. Such sources do, however, provide many indications that the Latvians are concerned--perhaps increasingly so--about the preservation of their national culture.

The leadership of the Latvian CP has frequently attacked any expression of nationalist feelings and "political immaturity" thereby demonstrating the persistence of such feelings. Cina criticized the Union of Writers and Artists in September of 1970 for not giving sufficient attention to the "ideological growth" of its members. The 1972 Congress of the Latvian Komsomol also heard criticism of poor political education work among young writers. [8] The existence of cultural nationalism and a desire on the part of young Latvian writers to revaluate those parts of the Latvian literary heritage that have been denigrated by the Soviets has been documented by Rolfs Ekmanis of Arizona State University. [9]

Augusts Voss, First Secretary of the CPL, has repeatedly castigated survivals of bourgeois nationalism among the population. [10] The publication of an official rebuttal--a highly inadequate one--to the so-called "Letter of 17 Latvian Communists," is evidence of the interest created by this letter when it was re-broadcast to Latvia by Radio Liberty. [11]

1. Rein Taagepera, 1972. For a Soviet viewpoint, see Vasi1i Aksenov, A Ticket To The Stars (N.Y. Signet Books, 1963), passim.
2. King, 1968: 62. For a similar sentiment among Lithuanians, see Soviet Analyst (November), 1972: I: 18: 4.
3. Sovetskaya Latviya (June 23), 1971.
4. E.G. see Cina (February 24), 1972, wherein the exiled Social Democratic leader Dr. Bruno Kalnins is accused of forging the "Letter of 17 Latvian Communists"; and Radio Liberty Dispatch, Dissidents Among the National Minorities in the USSR (August 29), 1972: 4.
5. See "Nationality Problems: Latvia," Soviet Analyst (March 2), 1972: I: 1: 4.
6. Taagepera, 1972: 7-9.
7. On the events of 1959 see the section on nationa1ism.
8. Cina, September 15, 1970; March 3, 1972. Sovietskaya Latviya (March 10), 1973, repeats criticism of this kind and directly connects it to nationalism. Translated in FBIS (March 19), 1973: FBIS -SOV-73-53: III: J2-J5.
9. Ekmanis, 1972: 59-60, 66.
10. See, for example, his articles in Pravda (March 20), 1971, and in Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye (June), 1972. The latter was quoted in Radio Liberty Dispatch (August 20), 1972: 4. Also see his speech to the XXI Congress of the CPL, Sovetskaya Latviya (February 26), 1971 (FBIS No. 55, Supp. 11, March 22, 1971, especially pages 60-61).
11. Soviet Analyst (April 13), 1972: Vol 1: 4: 4, (April 13, 1972). Private communications in Riga in June, 1963 indicated a belief that the "Letter" could have originated locally.