The Peace Initiative of the U.S.S.R. in 1934.

Neither the development of German aggression, nor the hostile position of the Baltic States could stop the Soviet Government from taking steps to ensure peace in the Baltic and to strengthen her own security. It was precisely because they took into account Hitler’s aggression in the Baltic that the Soviet Government on March 28, 1934, proposed to the German Government “ for the purpose of consolidating the general peace and in particular peace in Eastern Europe—— . . . to sign a Protocol in which the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the German Republic undertake that in their foreign policy they will invariably take into consideration the obligation to preserve the independence and integrity of the Baltic States, and would refrain from any acts whatever which might directly or indirectly injure this independence.”

The proposed Protocol should, in accordance with the idea of the Soviet Government, have remained open for adherence by other countries, who might be interested parties in this problem.

The initiative taken by the Soviet Government in regard to this question was occasioned by the exceptionally uneasy position in Eastern Europe at that time. The U.S.S.R., naturally, was interested in preserving the real independence and integrity of the Baltic States, in so far as the latter stand at the threshold of the Soviet Union and in so far as the integrity of these States was also a guarantee for the security of the U.S.S.R. itself.

Hitler’s Government, however, did not desire to bind their foreign policy in the East by any obligations whatever. On April 14, 1934, the German Minister in Moscow informed the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs that the German Government declined the Soviet proposal for the signature of the Protocol. We need hardly stop to consider Hitler’s “ arguments,” and we may safely limit ourselves to giving a quotation from the declaration which the People’s Commissar made to the German Ambassador : “ Particularly important is the very fact of the refusal of our proposal, the more so as the explanation given by the German Government in no way weakens the significance of this fact.”

Before making the proposal to Germany for a joint guarantee of the independence of the Baltic States, the Soviet Government had made a similar proposal to Poland. The then Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Beck, agreed to this proposal and negotiations were already in progress regarding the form in which this joint guarantee should be expressed. Suddenly, Beck signed with Hitler a Non-Aggression Treaty and simultaneously refused to continue the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on the question of a joint guarantee for the independence of the Baltic States.

It is also important to note here that the Baltic States themselves not only failed to express any goodwill towards the Soviet proposals which undoubtedly were directed towards consolidating their own independence and security, but, on the contrary, through the medium of their press they started an anti-Soviet campaign accusing the U.S.S.R. of certain “ arrière pensée ” and so on.

Simultaneously with the proposal to the German Government to guarantee jointly the independence of the Baltic States, the Soviet Government proposed to the latter the prolongation of the validity of their Non-Aggression and Neutrality Pacts with the U.S.S.R. The period of validity of these Treaties would have ended in the case of Latvia, Estonia and Finland in 1935, and Lithuania in 1936. On April 4, 1934, on the initiative of the Soviet Government, a Protocol was signed in Moscow prolonging the Non-Aggression Treaties to the end of 1945 (i.e. for ten years after the conclusion of the original period) ; the Conventions on conciliation procedure for the examination of questions under dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were similarly prolonged. On April 7, 1934, a Protocol which prolonged the Finnish-Soviet Pact up to 1945 was also signed, and on May 5, 1934, a similar Protocol was signed to prolong the Soviet-Polish Pact.

At a time of the ever-growing aggression of Fascist Germany, when the German Government rejected the proposal of the U.S.S.R. for a joint guarantee of the independence of the Baltic States, this Soviet peace initiative could not but emphasise very vividly the endeavour of the U.S.S.R. to attain real peace in Eastern Europe and her desire to establish really good, friendly relations with her Baltic neighbours. But we are compelled to stress again that this. initiative of the Soviet Government did not meet with that loyal support which might have been expected from the Baltic States.

We have already referred above to the attitude of these States towards the Eastern Pact. As a result of a curious coincidence, on the, same day when the German Note declining to participate in the Eastern Pact was published, viz., on September 12, 1934, a special Agreement between Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which was subsequently called “ The Baltic Entente,” was signed in Geneva. This Agreement in effect embodied the old hope of the anti-Soviet statesmen of the Baltic States for the formation of a “ Baltic bloc ” directed against the Soviet Union. In 1928, an attempt had even been made to attract Sweden to such a bloc. The visit of General Laidoner to the Swedish King in 1928 and the return visit of the Swedish King to Estonia in 1929, were accompanied by political talks regarding the participation of Sweden in a Baltic anti-Soviet bloc. In 1929 and 1930, similar visits were made by Estonian statesmen to Pilsudski and by the President of the Polish Republic to Estonia.

In 1934, the Baltic Entente inclined more and more towards a German orientation. It is characteristic that the Baltic Entente at the time of its formation was not a full-fledged military union in so far as neither Estonia nor Latvia were inclined to support Lithuania in her conflict with Poland (because of Vilno), and with Germany (because of Memel). The creation of the Baltic Entente was accom- panied by serious pressure on Lithuania by her partners in the new alliance. Latvia, just as Estonia (the latter in the person of General Laidoner), advised and recommended Lithuania to come to an “ amicable arrangement ” with Germany and Poland.

Thus, having taken up a hostile policy towards the Soviet proposals for a joint guarantee with Germany of their independence, having assumed, in spite of mere wordy declarations, a negative attitude towards the proposed Eastern Pact, the Baltic States concluded a military alliance, the aim of which was certainly not defence against German aggression. Later events demonstrated that it was the co-ordination of the hostile policy of the three countries towards the Soviet Union which constituted the real political significance of the formation of the Baltic Entente.

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