Soviet Aggression Against The Baltic Statesby Augusts Rumpēters

I.
POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS
AND THE USSR BEFORE SOVIET OCCUPATION

As a result of the successful liberation wars, Soviet Russia was compelled to conclude peace treaties with the Baltic States. The treaty with Estonia was signed on February 2, 1920;4 the treaty with Lithuania, on July 20, 1920;5 and that with Latvia on August 11 of the same year.6

By these treaties Soviet Russia unreservedly recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Baltic States and declared that it renounced “for eternity” (i.e. forever) all sovereign rights over the above-mentioned peoples and territories which formerly belonged to Russia. (The words “for eternity” in the original text read as “irrevocably” in the English text of these treaties published by the League of Nations.)[7]

At the initiative of the Government of the Soviet Union,8 all three of the Baltic States concluded non-aggression treaties with the Soviet Union, namely Lithuania on September 28, 1926;9 Latvia on February 5, 1932;10 and Estonia on May 4, 1932.11 These treaties were later amended and were in effect in 1940 when the Soviet Union arbitrarily occupied the Baltic States. By virtue of these treaties the contracting parties, among other things, undertook to refrain from any act of aggression directed against the other, and also from any acts of violence directed against the territorial integrity and inviolability or the political independence of the other contracting party; and to submit all disputes, whatever their kind of origin, which may arise between them and which cannot be settled by ordinary diplomatic procedure, to a procedure of conciliation in a joint conciliation commission. (Arts. I and IV of the Non-Aggression Treaties with Latvia and Estonia, and Arts. III and V of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Lithuania.) In addition, to these non-aggression treaties between the Soviet Union and the Baltic States, conventions were concluded on the conciliation procedure foreseen by the non-aggression treaties.12

Apart from these bilateral treaties, the Soviet Union came to an agreement with the Baltic States, as well as with others of its neighbors as early as 1929 concerning the immediate entry into force of the so-called Kellogg Pact. The protocol, with respect to the Pact, was signed by Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Roumania and the Soviet Union on February 9, 1929,[13] and Lithuania declared its adherence to it on April 5 of the same year. By signing the protocol, the contracting parties, among other things, agreed:

1. to condemn recourse to war for solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations,
2. that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.14

Finally, on July 3, 1933, the Soviet Union concluded with its neighbors, including the Baltic States, the Convention for the Definition of Aggression.[15] Article II of the Convention gives a clear definition of various forms of aggression, such as “invasion by its armed forces with or without a declaration of war of the territory of another State,” and Article III provides that “no political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article II.” The annex to Article III:

1. lists a number of conceivable excuses and justifications, as for instance the international conduct of a state, e.g., its political, economical or social structure, alleged defects in its administration, disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war;
2. stipulates that “the High Contracting Parties further agree to recognize that the present convention can never legitimate any violations of International Law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.”

As is evident from the quotation above, these treaties constituted an important and legally valid body of reciprocal obligations of which we shall mention the following:

1. the obligation to renounce war, i.e. the use of force as an instrument of national policy;
2. the obligation to abstain from any act of aggression and from any act of violence directed against the territorial integrity and inviolability of the political independence of any contracting party;
3. the obligation to arbitrate all disputes that might arise among two of the contracting states, and which might be impossible to solve through diplomatic channels;
4. the obligation to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of the other party.16

However, on the eve of World War II the Soviet Union did not honestly intend to fulfill all these obligations. First of all, during the so-called Moscow Negotiations with France and Great Britain in the first half of 1939, the USSR tried to obtain their consent that in the case of war the Soviet Union, in view of her own security, would defend the Baltic countries even if the latter did not want to defend themselves and did not ask for assistance from the USSR. The USSR did this in spite of the fact that it knew that the Baltic States did not want to be included in any kind of guaranty system with the USSR and wanted to remain neutral, as they had already declared.[17] The Baltic States feared — and, as history has shown, with full justification — that the “help and support” of the Soviet army would prove to be lethal medicine, annihilating their freedom and independence.18 Characterizing the demands of the Soviet Union, the British Foreign Secretary said to the British Ambassador in Ankara: “The Soviet Government proposes a formula which invokes naked interference in the internal affairs of the Baltic States.”19

Parallel to the above talks with Great Britain and France, the USSR initiated secret talks with Germany, raising the question of division of spheres of influence and demanding the inclusion of the Baltic States into its sphere of influence. This demand was realized by the Non-Aggression Treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany on August 23, 1939, and by a secret additional protocol, which was amended on September 28, 1939. According to this protocol, the Baltic States were included in the Soviet sphere of influence.[20]

Actually this agreement revealed nothing but the aim of Stalin and Hitler, i.e. the USSR and Germany, by creating spheres of influence to ensure territorial gains at the expense of other countries.21 Of course, from the point of view of international law, the protocol on division of spheres of influence was not binding on the Baltic States (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). Yet, in reference to them, the protocol revealed the secret and malicious intention of the Soviet Union to incorporate the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. Therefore, to a certain degree, we can consider this action of the Soviet Union to be in direct violation of the previously mentioned treaties, especially the peace treaties signed by the Soviet Union and the Baltic States.

The next step of the Soviet Union was to force the Baltic States to conclude separate Pacts of Mutual Assistance containing permission to establish Soviet military bases in the Baltic States.

The Baltic States were forced to sign the pacts. Estonia did so on September 28, 1939; Latvia concluded it on October 5th; and Lithuania, on October 10th, 1939. These pacts were concluded under pressure22 because during the talks on conclusion of the treaties requested by the USSR, it concentrated considerable masses of its armed forces along the borders of the Baltic States, and the Russian talks implied an indirect threat to occupy the Baltic countries, as was made evident by the Latvian Foreign Minister V. Munters’ report on discussions in the Kremlin before the actual conclusion of the treaties.23 Likewise, while asking the Estonian Foreign Minister to conclude the Pact of Mutual Assistance, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, V. M. Molotov, added ominously: “We advise you to accede to the wishes of the Soviet Union in order to avoid something worse. Do not compel the Soviet Union to use force in order to achieve her aims.”24

From the point of view presently dominant in international law, any coercion which contradicts previously accepted, already existing international obligations is considered unlawful and legally void.25 This principle, already in evidence in the Pact of Paris of August 26, 1928, (which, as previously mentioned, was effective also in reference to the Baltic States-USSR relations) was taken into consideration by the international military tribunal of the Nuremberg Trials which also included Soviet representatives.26

Considering the above, the Treaties of Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the Baltic States must, at least, be looked upon as voidable, an attitude taken also by B. Meissner.27

These pacts were correctly fulfilled and observed by the Baltic States, a fact confirmed by the USSR Foreign Minister Molotov in his speech at the Supreme Soviet session on March 29, 1940.28 Yet, the USSR in view of its ultimate designs was not satisfied with the installment of military bases and various privileges granted by the pacts.

The intention of the Soviet Union, as was proved later, was the occupation and incorporation of the Baltic States. This malicious intention was confirmed by a fact later verified that, as soon as the mutual assistance pacts had been effected, the General Staff of the Soviet Army issued operative maps of the Baltic territories labeled “First Edition, 1939” and carrying a title in large letters: “Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian SSR.”29 Even the clause contained in the pacts of mutual assistance, which stipulated that the enforcement of these pacts must in no way impair the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, especially with regard to their political structure, economic and social system, and their military measures,30 did not prevent the Soviet Union from realization of its intentions. The first ill omen was an article published by the Soviet newspaper “Izvestia” on the issue of war and the situation in the neutral countries. The article states: “The recent war events (occupation of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg) once more prove that neutrality of small states, which do not have power to support it, is a mere fantasy. Therefore, there are very few chances for small countries to survive and to maintain their independence.”31

At the beginning of May, strikes organized by the Lithuanian Communists started in Lithuania. On May 25th, 1940, Molotov suddenly presented the Lithuanian government with a note accusing Lithuanian authorities of the kidnapping of two Soviet soldiers. The Lithuanian government immediately undertook all possible measures in order to clarify the Soviet assertions. The efforts of the Lithuanian government to clear the case met with no response from the Soviet government. However, as early as June 8, during the negotiations in Moscow between the Lithuanian Prime Minister Merkis and Molotov, the latter, among others, came forth with new accusations against all three Baltic States, charging them with having formed an aggressive military alliance against the Soviet Union, although Molotov's charges were completely groundless.

Quite naturally, Merkis repudiated this accusation as being unfounded and, being unable to satisfy Molotov, proposed establishment of a conciliation commission provided for in the Non-Aggression Treaty between Lithuania and the Soviet Union. Molotov refused. All the efforts of the Lithuanian government to satisfy the rulers in Moscow were doomed to failure. The Soviet government was merely pursuing the plan to implement its secret agreements with Nazi Germany regarding the Baltic States.

On the evening of June 14th, Molotov presented to the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who at that time was in Moscow, a Soviet note demanding among other things:

1. immediate formation of a new government capable of assuring proper fulfillment of the mutual assistance pact;
2. immediate assurance of free entry into the territory of Lithuania for the units of the Soviet army which would be stationed in the most important centers of Lithuania.32

The concluding part of the note stated that the Soviet government would wait for an answer until 10 A.M., June 15th, but that if an answer were not received by that time, the Soviet Union would regard the note as having been rejected. Taking into consideration the hopeless situation, the impossibility of organizing military resistance during this short space of time, and the presence of Soviet troops at the bases on the territory of Lithuania, the Lithuanian government accepted this note.

On June 16th, 1940, Moscow presented similar notes to Latvia and Estonia.33 The ultimatum had to be answered the same day (June 16th). While transmitting these notes to the Latvian and Estonian envoys in Moscow, Molotov orally made a plain threat that if no answer indicating submission to the ultimatum were received by the stated time, the Red Army units, concentrated at the frontiers of Estonia and Latvia, would be ordered to march into these countries, suppressing all resistance by armed force.34 Thus the Soviet notes excluded any discussion of the demands presented by the Soviet Union, and Latvia and Estonia did not have an opportunity even to propose a clarification of the accusations contained in the above notes according to the procedure provided for by the conventions relating to conciliation procedure.

Dwelling on the character of these notes, one should mention that according to a definition given by Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, “ultimatum is the technical term for a written communication by one state to another which ends amicable negotiations respecting a difference and formulates for the last time and categorically the demands to be fulfilled if other measures are to be averted ... “35 Taking into consideration the contents of these notes and the above definition of an ultimatum, it is evident that in these specific cases the Soviet Union presented ultimata to the Baltic States, and they were even accompanied by threats. However, according to Oppenheim-Lauterpacht's well-founded opinion, such an ultimatum between the countries — adherents of the Paris Pact (and this was the case with the Baltic States and the Soviet Union) is “normally unlawful as it amounts to an anticipatory breach of the Pact.”36 Speaking expressly about the Soviet Union's ultimata delivered to the Baltic States, the same was stated by B. Meissner, who refers to H. Asbeck's opinion.[37] That the ultimata were unlawful is borne out more strongly with the knowledge that the accusations had no foundation in fact whatsoever. In fact, the Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Latvia and Estonia had already been concluded on November 1, 1923 (see League of Nations Treaty Series No. 578/24, p. 83-85), and while concluding the Non-Aggression Treaty with Latvia on February 5, 1932, the Soviet Union itself declared in the preamble of this treaty “that none of the obligations so far assumed by either of the Parties hinders the peaceful development of their mutual relations or is incompatible with the present Treaty.”[38] The same point of view, but in other words, was expressed in Article III of the same treaty.[39] Neither when concluding its treaty of Mutual Assistance with Latvia and the other Baltic States nor at any time later, even up to the moment of delivering its ultimata, had the Soviet Union ever demanded “the liquidation” of the alliance established by the treaty of Nov. 1, 1923, or had ever made any objections against it. The accusation contained in the ultimatum presented to Latvia, that Latvia had also enticed Lithuania into this treaty and was attempting to include Finland, was entirely false, and the Soviet Union has not yet proved the bases of its accusations. It is thus evident that the contents of the Soviet ultimata were in contradiction with the terms of the treaties concluded between the Baltic States and the Soviet Union. These ultimata were also in contradiction with the peace treaties and the Mutual Assistance Pacts between the Baltic States and Russia, and were nothing but interferences in the internal affairs of the Baltic States. With regard to the above, it is evident that the Soviet aggression instituted by these ultimata was not only a flagrant breach of international law, but also a violation of the most solemn, valid and binding treaty obligations. At the time of the delivery of the ultimata strong units of the Soviet armed forces were concentrated along the frontiers of the Baltic States, and Soviet military bases were already established in these States. Finland had just lost the war after her struggle against the Soviets. Under such circumstances the rejection of the ultimata by the Baltic States would have resulted in occupation with war and bloodshed. Therefore the acceptance by the Baltic States of the demands contained in the ultimata does not change the character of the USSR actions. The Nuremberg Military Tribunal was also of the same opinion, stating in its sentence that the approval of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the acting president of the state, Dr. Hacha, which approval was requested in the form of an ultimatum, did not justify Germany's action.[40] This sentence, as it was stated by B. Meissner, proceeded in general from the point of view that every invasion, whether it was based on an ultimatum or not, is an “act of aggression” and therefore is to be qualified as an international crime.[41] Taking into consideration the situation prevailing at the time when the USSR ultimata were delivered and the Soviet army invaded the Baltic States, the same should be said also about the qualifications of this action as an international crime. The assertion made by the USSR that the occupation of the Baltic States was necessary for the self-preservation of the Soviet Union is entirely unfounded. During the time when the ultimata were delivered as well as during the invasion which followed, no one was threatening the Soviet Union. The big western powers — France, Great Britain and Germany — were in a state of war; the latter had concluded with the USSR a non-aggression treaty, and they had come to an agreement concerning the division of the space between them into spheres of influence. In addition, at that particular time there existed good and friendly relations between the USSR and Germany. Therefore one cannot speak about any emergency situation which might have forced the Soviet Union to act aggressively against the Baltic States. The right to act in case of emergency can be used in the field of international relations only in the case of direct and otherwise inevitable danger.42 But in this specific case one can speak even less of self-defense as it is understood by international law, because such self-defense could only consist of an action necessary for defense or self-defense, but it could never be an encroachment,43 i.e. an invasion into the territory of another country. Thus, from the point of view of international law, these Soviet ultimata and the resultant occupation of the Baltic States which followed cannot be justified.