Briedis — Chapter 2

The Latvians organize

he Latvian Rifle Battalions were born of the all-embracing patriotism of that time, which the Latvians too saw no reason to reject; quite the contrary, they wished to demonstrate their own particular loyalty to Russia and its unity, hoping of course that this would help them to achieve the national consolidation they needed. Did that blazing hatred throughout the world against the Germans, which met a particular response among the Latvians, provide one of the more distinctive psychological foundations for the creation of unity in the Latvian armed forces, did it help to overcome resistance? He who thinks about these times and the harshness of the wartime circumstances, cannot but admit that the Latvians (after 1905) had indeed shown their own particular loyalty and that here there was an achievement and opportunity which could inspire and give hope to wider aims.

General Bangerskis said, while giving some of his reflections to Latvian battalions in the middle of August 1915 when he had been appointed to the staff of 5th Army, that Latvians alone could be relied upon not to repeat 1905. 'One thing seemed clear', began the general, 'German victories would to a very considerable extent strengthen the gentry and especially the German position in the Baltic now that it had been much weakened and where the Latvians have gained a position for themselves like the others.'1 So, there was no doubt that they must fight against Germany and, hopefully, the Riflemen would do it too. But could not certain cunning prophets be found who would bring about some irrational trick and thus sabotage the scheme for the Latvian Riflemen which had been so well thought out, to injure in this way the Latvian people for political reasons? With such reflections in my mind I found myself in Riga and made for the fortress of Daugavgrīva where I had been summoned. At the carriage I was met by a young lieutenant whose chest was adorned with the order of St George and at whose side hung the sword of St George. That surprised me and I introduced myself to him. That was the first occasion when I met and made the acquaintance of the future popular hero - Colonel Briedis.

'The fortress commandant was very pleased when we turned up,16 for, as he said, the troops are there, what we need are commanders. Volunteers are already beginning to arrive, but we were the first officers. He immediately offered us both a provisional command: - me the 1st Daugavgrīva, Briedis the 2nd Riga battalion.

'Briedis, who at this point had not the ghost of a chance of remaining in the post of battalion commander, refused and asked to be given the post of company commander in the first battalion. There were great difficulties with organisation and training. There were no officers, instructors were lacking, and uniforms and weapons were in short supply. Only gradually did these things turn up: beginning with Lt Būriņš and 2nd Lts. Dardzāns and Ilziņš. Though we got round the organisation of the work, we waited in vain for the uniforms and weapons. We just did the training without weapons, and only for musketry instruction were we able to obtain a few rifles from the commandant's fortress company. Some men could not take part in the instruction because of lack of footwear. This began to affect the state of the men's morale. Also this called to mind a conversation with General Cheremisov at 5th Army staff.'

Captain (as he then was) Bangerskis with the help of the fortress commander was sent on a mission to the staff of the NW Front where he was to inform them of the situation. The Chief of Staff questioned him and then told him to put forward a proposal for the employment of the battalion, which Bangerskis proceeded to do in agreement with the Organisational Committee. Immediately afterwards there began to appear a sufficiency of uniforms and footwear, Winchester Rifles and, finally, Maxim machine-guns. Until the battalion left for the front there were still shortages, particularly in uniforms. Still nothing could be done about this.

The Germans attack

On 28 September the Germans made an unexpected attack in the region of Jelgava, breaking through the front and reaching the vicinity of Olaine Station. On the second day we managed to throw them back across the River Misa and restore the line. In general, however, the situation at Riga was still uncertain. Every soldier was important, and, since the first Latvian battalions were close at hand, although still not completely equipped (a shortage was particularly felt in horses and transport), they were transferred from Mühlgraf to the Hussar barracks at Riga. The first 17 battalion had received weapons only on 26 September. The transfer to Riga took place on the 13th but the departure for the front came on 23 October, when only 59 days had elapsed since the arrival of the major party of volunteers. Smaller groups were still coming in, none had seen service. Not only were weapons lacking for fully adequate training but also the major assistance of instructor-trainers.

The Russian troops on the Riga front did not want to give up an important centre and feverishly prepared to defend it themselves. If a direct frontal attack on Riga was hardly conceivable, yet a manoeuvre across the Daugava to the south of Riga threatened the city with outflanking. There was therefore nervousness in the Russian staffs, among the troops, among the inhabitants. The events of October only increased this anxiety. The Germans came across the Misa at Plakani. To the south-west of Mangaļi they showed, a tendency to dig themselves in on an 'island' in the middle of the marsh. They had seized this as a stepping stone for a further advance.

On 23 October the commander of the 1st battalion was summoned to the Army HQ where the 2nd battalion commander, Lt.-Col. Francis, had been earlier. The Chief of Staff first of all enquired about the readiness of the battalion. The shortages in all branches had not decreased. Field kitchens were lacking, sets of warm underclothing were lacking; the rifles had been received only recently and there had not been time to complete the musketry drills. The 2nd battalion had even more shortages and it was decided to leave it behind; but the 1st battalion had to go up in the state that it was. Informed of the situation at the front, the Chief of Staff now said that activity could be anticipated in different directions. The most dangerous just then was at Plakani, from which it was approximately 10 kms to the Daugava, but to the Riga bridge 20 kms. It was essential to make a thorough reconnaissance in that direction. In the other direction between the Klīve forest area and the farmstead of Annas Muiža10 was also one of the shorter routes to Riga. The enemy tried to occupy the driest places in the marsh to the north of Mangaļi. The enemy's strength here, and also his aims, had to be ascertained. The Chief of Staff envisaged sending off a Latvian battalion in both directions, but since the 2nd was not ready for action the first would have to be divided, with two companies sent out in each direction. The companies were transported by rail to Pūpe or Olaine.18 The divisional HQ would give further instructions and would try to eradicate the battalion's defects in equipment.

When the Colonel had returned and informed the commanders, he decided to send to Olaine the companies of Briedis and Ilziņš, while the companies of Burins and Dardzāns were to go off in the direction of Lake Babite, because Briedis and Būriņš, who was senior in rank, did not get on.

'You had to see with what delight the riflemen received the news of being sent to the front and how unhappy were those who had to stay in Riga', said the battalion commander. A year later it would be otherwise. But then the composition of the units would be different. In the evening Briedis' and Ilziņs' companies set out by train which was sent to the barracks, while the companies of Būriņš and Dardzāns made for Torņkalns Station. About an hour after their departure from the barracks a Zeppelin flew over Riga and dropped some bombs on the bridge of which one each fell at the ends of the bridge. The bridge itself and several passers-by were untouched. Since this was the first of such flights and coincided with the departure of the Latvian battalion for the fronts everybody, including of course Captain Bangerskis, considered that the Germans were remarkably well informed of what was happening on the Russian side and that the bombs had been aimed directly at the Latvians. Already during their training smoke had been seen coming from a chimney in Cize's Shipyard - a clear signal to the Germans that here were the Latvians . . . There are, of course, spies in wartime and the Germans would not be short of them. But of greater significance is the spy mania which pictures the enemy as much wiser and quicker to react than he is in reality. When Bangerskis appeared before the divisional commander in the Olaine region, the latter was pleased with the arrival of the Latvians and promised to use them in reconnaissance tasks.

Because of a roundabout route Bangerskis was delayed in his arrival at the divisional commander's HQ at Pūpe Station. To his great surprise the battalion commander was congratulated on the brilliant successes of the Latvian riflemen. When Bangerskis said to the divisional commander that the riflemen were intended only for reconnaissance, that their transport was not up to battle standard and that losses could have a bad effect on them, the general answered that he had indeed sent them out on a reconnaissance mission but, whether they had met a similar German patrol by chance, or whether it had been a German attempt to consolidate in a drier area, the Germans had attacked and the Latvians had beaten back their attack. Bangerskis hurried in the direction of Mangaji to his companies. When he arrived there after several hours, he was cheerfully informed: 'The Germans attacked us but we threw them back. We've had some losses, but in return we took a prisoner.'

Counter-attack

Briedis too appeared at the burial of the first riflemen to fall to give his own and his company's salute.

It was then that he informed his battalion commander that the next day, that is, 29 October, it was envisaged that the company would be fighting the enemy, for he had decided to throw back the German units which had crossed the Misa. It would not be possible to do this in daylight, but he would carry out a night attack. He had already done a detailed reconnaissance, drawn up a plan which the divisional commander had acceded to. Bangerskis also agreed and helped him to obtain from the Organising Committee a number of white overalls, as had been laid down in Briedis' plan. The plan had emerged in this way:

After the commander of the 12th Siberian Division had ordered Briedis and his company to scout out the newly established German trenches on the right bank of the Misa near Plakani, Briedis over a period of three or four nights, had systematically, either himself with some officers and instructors or by sending out patrols, investigated the area in detail and the German position. At the same time selected men had been set to observe during the lighter hours of the night and to ascertain what was the most favourable time to carry out the operation.

Already the first results of the reconnaissance had encouraged Briedis to attack and to throw the Germans back across the river before they had dug themselves in in a position which would be very bad and threatening to the Russians. For the present the Germans on the north bank of the Misa had managed to put out only a thin layer of barbed wire; the trenches had been started only on the right 20 flank, while on the left there was still only a fence of wire. It would not be difficult then to break into the unfortified left flank, and it would be impossible for the Germans to support the units they had pushed forward from the main position, especially, if they were forced to keep their heads down by a supporting barrage of artillery and machine-guns.

The attack was to be launched in silence, without preliminary artillery preparation to break up the barbed wire entanglements at the place where the completed entanglements finished. One assault group (the larger) was to move along the trenches after fighting their way in with hand grenades. The other group would turn in the direction of a bridge, protecting the main group from the south and threatening the enemy's rear. Special groups with machine-guns were detailed as flank protection; on command they would open fire on the German bridgehead and prevent the enemy from sending help to his own men in the front areas, by moving along the trenches from the main position. For this purpose, as has already been said, artillery fire was to be directed on the immediate German rear, to the south of Plakāni.

It was not only the commanders who were informed of the plan, but also those who were to carry it out, so that everyone should know his task. Consequently the task in hand, which had been worked out in such detail and so boldly executed, was an unexpectedly brilliant success despite the fact that the soldiers were under fire for the first time. On 29 October snow had fallen, and movement forward had to be made on all fours, for the grey figures (the white overalls were only for the wire-cutters) stood out too clearly against the white snow. The wire-cutting was carried out in silence but the Germans immediately noticed something for they opened fire with shrapnel over the heads of the attackers and on the immediate Russian rear.

Also the German machine-gunners started firing short bursts as if not wishing to make an unreasonable noise. So the break into the trenches and the machine-gun fire on the German flanks took the Germans unawares; in the few minutes before they grasped what was really happening and from where the attack was coming, everything was over. One machine-gun, 35 rifles and 28 prisoners fell as trophies into the hands of the young soldiers. The remaining Germans were either killed or fled across the Misa. The German bridge-head was now in our hands, and was immediately transformed into a breastwork against the Germans.

21 From the interrogation of the prisoners it became known that Briedis and his company had vanquished a battalion of the 376th German infantry regiment. Briedis' company's losses: four killed, 11 wounded. This attack was also brought to the notice of the High Command and it became known all along the Russian front.

It was not only over the Germans that Briedis had gained a brilliant victory: it was also really only now in his own company, battalion and in Latvian society as a whole that he had become noted, and admired, as a young, extremely gifted and brave officer and also one who would take every detail into account. Briedis' reputation grew and continued to grow. Two weeks later, on 12 November, he had to present himself before the Emperor.

Patrolling continued. On the night of the of 3 November a unit of Briedis' company crept up unnoticed to a German company, surprised it sleeping, entered into combat and defeated it. Fairly heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy, but on our side the casualties were only one dead and four wounded.

However, Briedis did not always have successes - especially if the operations were planned and led by others. On 6 November the 1st and 4th companies with a training detachment and a machine-gun platoon under Briedis' command were to support the attack of the 48th Siberian regiment on Olaines muiža, so as to throw the Germans back across the Misa and further to the west. Our units had to attack to the south of Kutnieki, in daytime and across the open marsh. The Russian battalion had to attack in the direction of Olaines muiža. The Russians gave way under a German counter-attack and retreated. So the Latvian units on their own had to bear the full weight of the attack. The enterprise ended in failure with very severe losses: 21 dead, 64 wounded and 19 missing.

Master tactician

On the night of 23 November a 'Briedis day' came again. This was one of the more remarkable of Briedis' actions in the autumn of 1915, and it illustrated once more Briedis' ability to organise and lead an operation. The Russian and German positions in the region of Veisu Mājas were separated by the R. Misa, which was deep and had steep banks. On both sides of the river was a wood, but now the trees had been sawn down and smashed to pieces in a zone 300-500 metres along both banks. The Russian positions ran here along the edge of the wood; the German likewise, along the edge of the wood 22 on the other side. In this region Briedis' company was ordered to carry out a reconnaissance and take some prisoners, because information had come in that the Germans in this vicinity were concentrating their forces in order to go over to the attack.

Over three or four nights Briedis carried out a reconnaissance with his entire company, sending out patrols of six to eight volunteers. In this way he discovered that Veisu Mājas at the edge of the German positions had been destroyed, but the Germans had organised a fortified advance post on a village hillock, 200-300 metres in advance of their main position. Briedis decided to attack Veisu Majas, though it meant crossing a fairly deep and not yet frozen river and even though the fortifications around the ruins of the village were linked to the main position through a horseshoe-shaped communication trench. He set up a listening post to observe German activity in the daytime, among the smashed trees. His plan of attack was as follows: two patrols of volunteers were to get across the Misa and cut the wire fence running along the double horseshoe-shaped communication trench which linked the outpost with the main German position, each patrol from its own side, so as to enter the German outpost from the rear. Two platoons were to attack the 'horseshoe' from the west (it was here that one might expect German reinforcements to come up, and the German machine-guns were also nearer here), while one platoon was to attack from the east. Briedis kept the fourth platoon on both sides of the river to reinforce the attack or to cover a retreat. He had also worked out a detailed plan, showing who should do what, from where the attack should start and where it was to finish. He himself would remain with the group which would cover the retreat.

On the night of 22 November, at approximately 10 o'clock, Briedis had brought his company forward to the Misa. About an hour later the scouts had crept up to the wire behind Veisu Mājas from the east, but the Germans had noticed and opened fire. The scouts crept back 50 paces. The German fire lasted half an hour and then fell silent; Briedis had forbidden his own men to return fire in such a situation.

After a while when there was silence again, Briedis gave the order to crawl forward again and cut the wire. This was done and they cut a gap in the fence two or three feet wide. Briedis told them to widen this gap which they did after crawling forward once more. The barbed wire fences turned out to be 20-30 metres distant from the communication trench along which the Germans had carried knife rests,2 that is, devices made of logs round which wire had been wound.

22 Briedis now withdrew the wire-cutters, instructing them to destroy the machine-gun of which the location was known with hand-grenades during the attack. It was more or less in this way that Briedis now ordered the rolling up of the fence and the attack of the larger group to come in from the west. Here Briedis laid down a smokescreen to give protection against machine-guns, two of which had been located on this side of the main position.

After the launching of the attack on this side, a platoon had also broken into the German trenches from the other: following Briedis' plan they overwhelmed the German machine-guns with handgrenades. In less than half an hour the fortification at Veisu Mājas had been occupied; 11 prisoners, 11 rifles and one machine-gun were seized.

At the start of the attack the Russian artillery had been ordered to open fire on the main German position. Our losses were two wounded (according to another report - only one slightly wounded, in the hand). The corps staff which had organised the arrival in this sector of the Latvian battalion had never seen a single German prisoner.3 Now pretty large groups of these were to be seen. Wasn't this strange! And what sort of people were these who were not afraid of the Germans. It seemed like a miracle at the time, especially to the troops in the trenches.

Not only to them. Dynamic German leadership in battle and their military qualities had been shown to be a myth: the Latvians together with Briedis had appeared as a warning that one should not think of the Germans as miracle workers. They were just men like all the others, with all the same qualities. For his own part, Briedis himself, without wanting to, became the founder of a Latvian myth - the same myth which would in the end bring about his murder.

The innovator and the man

The foundation of Briedis' tactics may be further examined in other cases. The essence of such tactics was that, if one wanted to surprise the enemy, diligent preparations were necessary. If one wanted to surprise the enemy, nothing was to be gained by warning him by too weak an artillery preparation, as was usual then on the Russian side and could never be sufficiently intensive to prepare the way for the infantryman. Then he tried to approach the enemy 'unwarned', at night; all that was required of the artillery was to interdict the sector being attacked (to prevent reinforcements coming forward or to secure our flanks when the breach had already been made).

He was an innovator in the sense that he was pouring old wine into new24 bottles, that is, he was trying to apply the tried and tested principles of military science, fully adapted through his ingenuity, to the circumstances as they stood. At the time one heard ad nauseam: 'the company will deploy in line from left to right and will advance in waves'. 'Fieldcraft training' began with that and almost always finished with that. That is still remembered as the innovation which is linked with Briedis' name and also with that of the 1st Daugavgriva Battalion (or, as it later became, regiment). Without in any way belittling the efforts of the others, the 1st Latvian rifle battalion was, and remained among the old riflemen, the first in the minds of the rest of us, even if we did not willingly admit it. We spoke loudly of its reputation.

Briedis, of course, needed fighters who could meet the demands made of them. In the battalion journal it can be seen how on 3 September Briedis exchanged 48 under-age youths in his company for adults from the reserve company. It is not clear from the journal whether any other would have done this. Of course, because of a shortage of men not all could do this. G. Krēsliņš (then an instructor in Briedis' company and later an officer in the first regiment) said of the company and Briedis: 'The platoon commanders (sergeants, at that time senior NCOs) were the following: 1st platoon - Grikmanis (St George, 4th cl.); 2nd platoon (where I was) - Junkers, very tall, fearless, also St George 4th cl., they wanted to give him a commission for merit in the field but could not do so, as he could not read. In the 3rd platoon it was Kalniņš (also St George 4th cl.), while in the fourth platoon it was senior sergeant Lauris (likewise St George 4th cl.). The latter was on a reconnaissance mission to Jelgava. He along with several others who were from Rigas Jūrmala had got round the German frontline by taking a fishing boat. They had landed wearing shabby civilian clothes, walked to Jelgava and made their way back after a few weeks. The senior-sergeant of the 1st company was a cadet officer, Āboļkalns (or perhaps Abejkalns), and he too had been awarded the cross of St George 4th class.

'Briedis was of meagre build, slim, of average height (perhaps 165-175 cms), dry, very full of life and active: on patrols he was in the habit of carrying a riding crop. When Briedis walked in front of his company, the company could only follow him at the run. He did not have either a moustache or a beard. He did not suffer from the cold and so wasn't in the habit of wearing a greatcoat, except when on parade when it was obligatory. He usually had on his back a black double-breasted jacket made of skin; on his feet he usually wore felt boots.

Illustrations inset between pages 24 and 25.

'Briedis was warm-hearted, yet never descended to familiarity;<>25 was very kind and obliging, took care of his men and did not put them at risk unless it was necessary. He always explained battlefield tasks in great detail. Both the attacks at Veisu were diligently prepared beforehand. In his training he would demonstrate how to get through barbed wire entanglements and how to cross open ground. Briedis always went first and controlled everything. Yet he was always the first to go to ground and show that a rifleman should take advantage of cover. When he had to make an attack he would explain all the circumstances by the light of day with the result that the night attack would come as a surprise and would, therefore, succeed.

'Briedis discovered various new methods to overcome barbed wire entanglements. Firstly he would try throwing wattle mats over them - but these weren't really effective because the fence posts were not always of the same height. Best of all was to cut through the wire with large shears on both sides of the post and then pull the post itself out of the ground. Two riflemen would go ahead to do the cutting. Hardly had the wire been cut through than it was pulled back and then everybody would silently steal through the gap created. Already on St Martin's Eve (10/23 November) they used white overalls as it had snowed. Some wire entanglements were blown up using reinforced charges of pyroxiline. These were made from from four pieces attached to a board and shoved just below the wire fence. A Bickford cord fuse was attached to the charges which were ignited before the demolition team withdrew about 50 paces. At the moment of the explosion the whole company threw themselves forward at the point where the gap had been torn (the gates were open to a width of 20 feet). To begin with, Briedis' company used these methods on their own. But later other companies also learned them, carrying out training according to Briedis' example. It was even said (I cannot confirm this) that rockets with parachutes had been invented by Briedis, and that the factories were manufacturing them on his instructions. (In reality the mats and the explosive charges too were not Briedis' discoveries - examples of them had even been sent to military units, as well as drawings and dimensions, material instructions, etc.) Briedis' merit was that he tried to test everything assiduously to find which was the most suitable. The mats were of little use and not only because of the unevenness of the posts, while explosives too had serious defects - they immediately drew attention to the true break-in point. Everything depended on what was the most suitable thing to use on each occasion. But what is of significance here is the extent to which Briedis' prestige had grown among his own men. Briedis and Bangerskis (the26battalion commander) shared the same dug-out; in the front room were two clerks and the battalion office. The other officers lived with their companies. The company clerk was with the company; all four platoons were in a single dug-out. Briedis put in an appearance in his company's dug-out every morning, carried out an inspection and chatted with the lads. There was a great deal of harmony at that time among the riflemen: one would come to the assistance of the other; there were never any misunderstandings. In the company there were some 'cut-throats' - guttersnipes from Grīzinkalns. I remember a certain Puidaks, but he was my best friend.'

One who was longest in the Latvian riflemen along with Briedis was P. Dardzāns. He described Briedis thus: 'Briedis was not a tall man, at any rate below average height - 5'3" - 5'4". His face was oval with a straight well-formed nose, and steel-blue eyes. His walk was light and springy, his movements were rapid, but in a moment of need tightly controlled. His way of extending his arm was out of the ordinary. He did not stretch his arm out straight in front of him, but always kept his elbow pressed to his side. He spoke Latvian with a marked but indefinable accent. It was not Russian or German but perhaps a mixture of the Latvian spoken dialect of his parents and the imprint of the Russian which he had used for many a year in school and during his military service. I couldn't say what form of Latvian dialect his parents spoke: all I know is that Briedis' elder brother, whom I knew personally later, spoke pure Latvian.

'Briedis was very controlled by nature and his voice carried well even though it was low-pitched. All that time from 1915 to 1918, whenever I saw him or met him, I never heard him speak in a sullen raised voice or use rude words. He was always brisk, friendly and optimistic in himself. It is true that he had become a devotee of yoga and, in critical moments as well as in the mornings when he was beginning his walks, he would always spend some time in concentration, turning his thoughts inward.

'One could not say that Briedis was particularly handsome, but a certain sweetness shone through all his being. He was a great success with the ladies for he knew just how to talk to them. Also he liked the company of ladies.

'Briedis took little interest in the economic side of the war but 27 was mainly concerned with it from the tactical point of view and that of combat. If Bangerskis was the staff planner, then Briedis was the eagle in battle who brought these plans to fruition. Compared to the ponderous and reserved Bangerskis, Briedis seemed to be light and charming. We other officers went into battle dressed to resemble other ranks. We often carried rifles in our hands as well.4 Briedis on the other hand liked to spruce himself up. Even in battle he would wear his officer's greatcoat. It seemed to me that this officer's greatcoat was the reason why he was wounded in the March offensive. It could even be that he was also wounded in the Christmas battles because of this distinctive attire.

'I want to draw attention to Briedis' most important quality, his luck! Napoleon said that he did not need marshals who were unlucky. Briedis would certainly have earned his marshal's baton under Napoleon, for everything that he undertook was crowned with success. Leading an army in battle is a very complicated thing. The best plans go awry if there is just 'something' lacking. And this 'something' was the main reason for and the foundation of his success. It can be called a sixth sense or intuition. Briedis was endowed with the sixth sense, and that's why we remember him as a hero and great soldier.

Like all evidence, here too one chances on discrepancies, for example, about his wearing a greatcoat; also as regards his height. As I see him, Briedis seemed to be definitely a man of average height, who completely disappears standing beside Bangerskis, which is in complete agreement with his classification at the military academy. Yet there appear to be fewer differences when comparing notes on Briedis' generally clearly drawn external appearance and - what is the main thing - his personality as a man.

---

1	The population of Latvia (along with Estonia) contained a sizeable population of Germans. These had been there since the Middle Ages and generally represented the upper class over a Latvian (or Estonian) peasantry. Until the reign of Alexander III they had served the Tsarist regime with exemplary loyalty. The policies of that Tsar, which favoured ethnic Russians and the Orthodox religion, alienated many of these Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans), and their sympathies turned towards the Central Powers, in particular Imperial Germany. Naturally the native Latvians felt they were threatened by a combination of local Germans allied with the Imperial German forces. The only other option was to fight for Imperial Russia, in the hope, eventually, of autonomy or independence. The danger from the German side was not imaginary. Pan-Germans in the German High Command and Governing circles had plans to annex these provinces of the Russian Empire as Crown Lands or, alternatively, to turn them into vassal states, with, as rulers, junior members of the German royal families.—D.G. (original footnote)
2	'Knife rests' were a standard feature of trench warfare which were used for blocking off sections of trench to contain enemy penetrations. These forced the enemy to pass them above ground thereby exposing him to the fire of the defenders. They are probably linear descendants of the chevaux de frise.—D.G. (original footnote)
3	This is not an unlikely scenario. While the Russian armies were generally a match for those of Austria-Hungary, with their often disaffected units made up of non- German recruits, their attacks against the Germans in the north were often disasters. One reason commonly advanced, though it is not the only one, was bad planning and sloppy staff work (incidentally, Gough's 5th Army in the West was faced with the same accusations). Curiously enough, Briedis with his insistence on good preparation and adequate reconnaissance, is displaying German characteristics!—D.G. (original footnote)
4	Even with the introduction of drabber colours - khaki, feldgrau and horizon blue - officers' uniforms were normally clearly distinguished, and not only by badges of rank, from the uniforms of other ranks; they also usually carried different small arms. It was soon noticed that these differences, however small, made officers a likely target for enemy snipers. There are numerous accounts of warfare on the Western Front which describe officers, before going over the top, putting on other ranks' tunics and carrying rifles instead of pistols and revolvers. This is the first account I have seen on the Eastern Front, though no doubt there are others.—D.G. (original footnote)