latviski
THE FOREIGN
POLICY OF THE U.S.S.R. and HER RELATIONS WITH
THE BALTIC STATES IN THE PERIOD 1933-1939
1933 saw some change in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Baltic States. This was the year of the Hitler coup in Germany, and the Baltic countries found themselves between, on the one hand, Fascist Germany striving not only to annul the Articles of the Versailles Treaty, but also to establish her own supremacy in the whole of Europe, and on the other, the Soviet Union, which was pursuing her invariable policy for the consolidation of world peace in general, and in Eastern Europe in particular. It would have seemed that the choice between these two directly opposite tendencies should have been quite clear for the Baltic countries ; it would have appeared that their national interest, their solicitude for the preservation of their political independence and national culture should have indicated to them their only possible road, to look for support to the Soviet Union and to assist the latter in her struggle against the aggressive aims of German Fascism. However, the policy chosen by the Baltic States was, in effect, diametrically opposed to their own interests.
In spite of Hitler’s aggressive plans, which were also directed against the Baltic States, in spite of the fact that in his book “ Mein Kampf ” he had definitely declared that his aim was to seize the Baltic countries, in spite of the fact that these aims were even more fully and clearly expressed in many of the writings of one of Hitler’s assistants, Rosenberg (himself it may be well to recall, a native of Estonia), in spite of the fact that at the London Economic Conference in 1933 a member of Hitler’s Government, Hugenberg, presented a Memorandum in which he demanded for Germany the right of colonisation of the whole of Eastern Europe (the Baltic States and various territories of the Soviet Union)—in spite of all this, we repeat, the Baltic countries failed to draw the only possible conclusion which the international position and their instinct of self-preservation should have dictated to them.
Only in the summer of 1933, influenced no doubt by Hitler’s direct threats, did the Baltic States accept the proposals of the Soviet Government and sign in London a Convention for the Definition of an Aggressor. This Convention was signed by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and also by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. It is interesting to note that the, most hostile attitude towards the Soviet proposals was shown by Poland and Finland. Poland did not wish to sign this Convention at all, and it was only the pressure of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Rumania, Titulescu, which forced the Polish Government to agree to sign the Convention. Poland at that time valued very highly her good relations with Rumania. As for Finland, she took up a peculiar position ; she did not sign the Convention together with the others, and for a long time refused to sign. The Finnish Government considered it necessary to conduct special negotiations with Hitler, and only when Finland had received “ permission ” from Hitler, did the Finnish Government also sign the Convention to Define an Aggressor.
Immediately following his coming to power, Hitler sfarted an energetic campaign for the political subordination of the Baltic States to the plan of German Fascism. The most favourable and already well-prepared soil he found in Finland, where the Government Coalition Party and all the anti-Soviet organisations mentioned above, were entirely at his disposal.
The undermining campaign in Estonia was conducted along two channels—through the Fascist German minority in Estonia and through the Estonian Fascist Organisation, the “ Veterans Union.” The results of this undermining activity were pretty substantial. It is characteristic, for instance, how the Estonian press interpreted the conspiracy of the “ Veterans Union ” which was unearthed on December 8, 1935. Whilst the whole of the world press was full of information proving that the threads of this conspiracy led direct to Berlin, whilst in many foreign journals facts were given showing how the conspiracy had been subsidised by Hitler’s Germany and also that the Estonian conspirators had received arms from Germany, the Estonian press suppressed these facts. Only once did the Estonian semi-official paper “ Uusi Eesti ” timidly mention that the German Government radio station had openly expressed dissatisfaction that this conspiracy had failed.
The Hitler policy in relation to Latvia was very similar.
The Eastern Pact.
Already in 1933, on the initiative of France and the U.S.S.R., negotiations had started for the conclusion of the so-called “ Eastern Pact.” It was proposed to include eight States in this Pact—Germany, U.S.S.R., Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Czechoslovakia. All these States were to render one another military help automatically if any one of them were attacked. France, though not participating in the Pact, was to guarantee it, whilst the U.S.S.R., not being a participant of the Locarno Pact, was to guarantee the latter.
During the negotiations with France, the Soviet Government also proposed to include in the system of the Eastern Pact, Belgium as a country bordering on Germany.
It is quite evident that such a system, if really carried out, could have formed an effective barrier against German aggression ; and as Laval, the man who did most to foil the conclusion of this Pact, said it might guarantee that—“ not a single border-stone in Europe would be moved.”
On September 12, 1934, the German Government after a seven months’ “ study ” of the draft of the Eastern Pact replied refusing to participate in it. Hitler quite correctly understood the danger which threatened him from the Eastern Pact, which would have prevented the moving of “ frontier stones and which provided for sanctions against such “ shiftings.”
Following Germany, or rather by agreement with her, Poland also refused to participate in the Pact giving as an excuse the fact that she had recently concluded a Pact of Non-Aggression with Germany. The speech on this subject by the then Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Beck, was opposed in Poland itself only by the organ of the National Democratic Party, which indicated the dire consequences for Poland which would result from her friendship with Hitler.
As for the Baltic States, their attitude towards the Eastern Pact was clearly hostile, although on the surface they made declarations of goodwill. Finland declined altogether to make any reply to the proposal for an Eastern Pact. Finnish diplomacy understood very well that the Eastern Pact was a strong weapon against Germany should the latter start on a course of aggression in one direction or another. It was quite evident that under the circumstances Finland did not desire to make a favourable reply.
As for the other Baltic States, their behaviour was more than suspicious. Thus, in July, 1934, the Latvian Minister in Moscow informed the Government of the U.S.S.R. that Latvia in principle agreed to sign this Pact. Similarly, during his visit to Moscow in the summer of 1934, the Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Selyamaa, also declared that Estonia in principle agreed to sign the Pact. But although in December of the same year, i.e. after the negative reply given by Germany and Poland, the Latvian Mission in Paris issued a special “ denial ” of the insistent rumours that Latvia and Estonia had changed their decision and had no intention of joining the Eastern Pact, nevertheless the position both of Latvia and Estonia did in fact change immediately after the refusal of Germany and Poland to subscribe to it.
Indeed, it is extremely interesting to note that Latvia and Estonia, when giving their consent in principle to participate in the Eastern Pact, invariably made their agreement dependent on a favourable reply from Poland to this question. Moreover, when insisting on this condition, the Latvian and Estonian Governments already knew that Poland would refuse to adhere to the Eastern Pact.
In this connection one cannot but also note that in 1934 the Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Selyamaa, visited Warsaw “ on his way to Vienna,” and whilst there he had an interview with the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Beck. This visit to Warsaw took place at the moment when Goering was conducting negotiations in Warsaw which were certainly not directed towards the maintenance of peace in Eastern Europe.
The Peace Initiative of the U.S.S.R. in 1934.
Neither the development of German aggression, nor the hostile position of the Baltic States could stop the Soviet Government from taking steps to ensure peace in the Baltic and to strengthen her own security. It was precisely because they took into account Hitler’s aggression in the Baltic that the Soviet Government on March 28, 1934, proposed to the German Government “ for the purpose of consolidating the general peace and in particular peace in Eastern Europe—— . . . to sign a Protocol in which the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the German Republic undertake that in their foreign policy they will invariably take into consideration the obligation to preserve the independence and integrity of the Baltic States, and would refrain from any acts whatever which might directly or indirectly injure this independence.”
The proposed Protocol should, in accordance with the idea of the Soviet Government, have remained open for adherence by other countries, who might be interested parties in this problem.
The initiative taken by the Soviet Government in regard to this question was occasioned by the exceptionally uneasy position in Eastern Europe at that time. The U.S.S.R., naturally, was interested in preserving the real independence and integrity of the Baltic States, in so far as the latter stand at the threshold of the Soviet Union and in so far as the integrity of these States was also a guarantee for the security of the U.S.S.R. itself.
Hitler’s Government, however, did not desire to bind their foreign policy in the East by any obligations whatever. On April 14, 1934, the German Minister in Moscow informed the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs that the German Government declined the Soviet proposal for the signature of the Protocol. We need hardly stop to consider Hitler’s “ arguments,” and we may safely limit ourselves to giving a quotation from the declaration which the People’s Commissar made to the German Ambassador : “ Particularly important is the very fact of the refusal of our proposal, the more so as the explanation given by the German Government in no way weakens the significance of this fact.”
Before making the proposal to Germany for a joint guarantee of the independence of the Baltic States, the Soviet Government had made a similar proposal to Poland. The then Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Beck, agreed to this proposal and negotiations were already in progress regarding the form in which this joint guarantee should be expressed. Suddenly, Beck signed with Hitler a Non-Aggression Treaty and simultaneously refused to continue the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on the question of a joint guarantee for the independence of the Baltic States.
It is also important to note here that the Baltic States themselves not only failed to express any goodwill towards the Soviet proposals which undoubtedly were directed towards consolidating their own independence and security, but, on the contrary, through the medium of their press they started an anti-Soviet campaign accusing the U.S.S.R. of certain “ arrière pensée ” and so on.
Simultaneously with the proposal to the German Government to guarantee jointly the independence of the Baltic States, the Soviet Government proposed to the latter the prolongation of the validity of their Non-Aggression and Neutrality Pacts with the U.S.S.R. The period of validity of these Treaties would have ended in the case of Latvia, Estonia and Finland in 1935, and Lithuania in 1936. On April 4, 1934, on the initiative of the Soviet Government, a Protocol was signed in Moscow prolonging the Non-Aggression Treaties to the end of 1945 (i.e. for ten years after the conclusion of the original period) ; the Conventions on conciliation procedure for the examination of questions under dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were similarly prolonged. On April 7, 1934, a Protocol which prolonged the Finnish-Soviet Pact up to 1945 was also signed, and on May 5, 1934, a similar Protocol was signed to prolong the Soviet-Polish Pact.
At a time of the ever-growing aggression of Fascist Germany, when the German Government rejected the proposal of the U.S.S.R. for a joint guarantee of the independence of the Baltic States, this Soviet peace initiative could not but emphasise very vividly the endeavour of the U.S.S.R. to attain real peace in Eastern Europe and her desire to establish really good, friendly relations with her Baltic neighbours. But we are compelled to stress again that this. initiative of the Soviet Government did not meet with that loyal support which might have been expected from the Baltic States.
We have already referred above to the attitude of these States towards the Eastern Pact. As a result of a curious coincidence, on the, same day when the German Note declining to participate in the Eastern Pact was published, viz., on September 12, 1934, a special Agreement between Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which was subsequently called “ The Baltic Entente,” was signed in Geneva. This Agreement in effect embodied the old hope of the anti-Soviet statesmen of the Baltic States for the formation of a “ Baltic bloc ” directed against the Soviet Union. In 1928, an attempt had even been made to attract Sweden to such a bloc. The visit of General Laidoner to the Swedish King in 1928 and the return visit of the Swedish King to Estonia in 1929, were accompanied by political talks regarding the participation of Sweden in a Baltic anti-Soviet bloc. In 1929 and 1930, similar visits were made by Estonian statesmen to Pilsudski and by the President of the Polish Republic to Estonia.
In 1934, the Baltic Entente inclined more and more towards a German orientation. It is characteristic that the Baltic Entente at the time of its formation was not a full-fledged military union in so far as neither Estonia nor Latvia were inclined to support Lithuania in her conflict with Poland (because of Vilno), and with Germany (because of Memel). The creation of the Baltic Entente was accom- panied by serious pressure on Lithuania by her partners in the new alliance. Latvia, just as Estonia (the latter in the person of General Laidoner), advised and recommended Lithuania to come to an “ amicable arrangement ” with Germany and Poland.
Thus, having taken up a hostile policy towards the Soviet proposals for a joint guarantee with Germany of their independence, having assumed, in spite of mere wordy declarations, a negative attitude towards the proposed Eastern Pact, the Baltic States concluded a military alliance, the aim of which was certainly not defence against German aggression. Later events demonstrated that it was the co-ordination of the hostile policy of the three countries towards the Soviet Union which constituted the real political significance of the formation of the Baltic Entente.
The Anglo-French-Soviet Negotiations of 1939 and the Position of the Baltic States.
During the whole period between 1934 and 1939, the undermining work of Hitler’s Germany in the Baltic countries continued unceasingly, and became more assiduous with every year, indeed with every month.
The Government of Finland, as might have been expected, proved to be the most closely orientated towards Germany, and in 1939 they had placed their country completely at the disposal of Hitler. Up to 1939, Hitler had had least success in Lithuania, since the question of Memel continued to be a bone of contention between Lithuania and Germany. On March 22, 1939, a Treaty was signed in Berlin transferring Klaiped (Memel) together with the whole of the surrounding district to Germany. This “ Treaty ” can hardly be considered a Treaty in the ordinary sense of that word, seeing that it had been brutally dictated to the Lithuanian Government under threat of an immediate movement of troops for the armed seizure of Memel.
It should be noted that after the seizure of Czechoslovakia and Memel, the Soviet Government made an official statement to the Governments of Latvia and Estonia, declaring that the Soviet Government could not permit the transformation of Latvia and Estonia into territories dependent on Germany, and should Hitler make any threats against Latvia and Estonia they could count on aid from the Soviet Union. Neither Government, however, made any response to this declaration of the Soviet Government. Moreover, on June 7, 1939 Latvia and Estonia signed non-aggression agreements with Germany.
History has already demonstrated the value of “ Treaties of Non-Aggression ” signed by Hitler. Latvia and Estonia obtained their “ Treaties of Non-Aggression ” in order that, at a convenient moment, under cover of the Non-Aggression obligations, they would be subjected to an attack by Germany.
However, the signature of these Treaties was a convenient pretext for the statesmen of Latvia and Estonia, “ justifying ” their hostile attitude towards the U.S.S.R., during the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations ; this, of course, refers to the question of the guarantee of their security which was to have been formulated in the three-Power Pact (Britain, France, U.S.S.R.).
Going back somewhat, we should like to recall that during the French-Soviet negotiations of 1935 which led to the signature of a Pact of Mutual Assistance, the U.S.S.R. insisted on the inclusion in this Pact of a guarantee of the integrity of the Baltic States and, in return for this, the Soviet Union agreed to give her guarantee for the frontiers of Belgium, but this proposal was, of course, declined by Laval.
Being interested in her own security and considering that the violation of the independence (in any form whatever) of the Baltic States was a threat to herself, the U.S.S.R. demanded the inclusion of such a guarantee. On June 7, 1939, the then British Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, declared in Parliament : “ There remain one or two difficulties (in the negotiations), in particular the position of certain States, which did not want to receive a guarantee on the ground that it would compromise the strict neutrality which they desire to preserve.” These “ certain States ” were the Baltic States. The “ strict neutrality ” which the Baltic States intended to preserve reduced itself to the fulfilment of German demands. It was precisely Fascist Germany which was interested in preventing the Baltic countries from being guaranteed by Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R.
It is extremely important to note that the present British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, in the course of an article in the “ Daily Telegraph and Morning Post,” June 8, 1939, referring to the demand of the Soviet Union for a guarantee of the Baltic States, said : “ The Russian claim that these (States) should be included in the triple guarantee is well-founded. There is no sense in having a crack in the peace diving bell.”
The well-known journalist and French Parliamentary Deputy, Henri de Kerillis, wrote in the “ Epoch,” of July 12 : “ As regards the guarantee to the Baltic States, the demands of the Soviet Union are absolutely justified and logical . . . . it is said that neither, Finland nor Estonia, nor Latvia, desires a French-Anglo-Soviet guarantee. What devilry! If they do not desire this guarantee, then this is only another reason for uneasiness.”
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